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Abstract 
 
Under high inflation, money’s dual function as a unit of account and a unit of payment are split and 
transferred on alternate supports—either a foreign currency (as in Argentina) or domestic indices (as 
in Brazil). This paper compares the 1994 Brazilian Plano Real, which rebuilt a working, national 
monetary order, and the bimonetary Argentine Currency Board regime, whose 2001 collapse caused a 
major dislocation of both the real economy and the financial sector. “Pesification” is analyzed as an 
improvised attempt to rebuild a single, national money. Whereas returning to peso pricing on domestic 
markets proved to be surprisingly easy, the conversion of financial contracts (deposits, credits, bonds, 
etc.) was a disaster: state intervention into existing private contracts opened the way for a large-scale 
but opaque redistribution of private wealth. The experience of monetary destruction and reconstruction 
sheds light on how policy or regulatory intervention interacts with private choices. Policy efficiency is 
conditional on the willingness of agents to continue using the national money. Yet states that use 
money as a policy instrument may affect the agents perception that its stability is a condition for their 
own continuing private capacity to calculate and optimize. The effects of hyperinflation suggest that 
this constitutive ambiguity may actually result in the destruction of money. 
 
This contribution draws from Sgard (2008, in French), with a reduced empirical material and an 
extended analytical discussion.  
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Money Reconstructed: 
Argentina and Brazil after Hyperinflation 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Money is usually seen in action but rarely in construction. For instance, one may observe the issuing 
policy of central banks or the trade-offs faced by agents when buying or selling on a foreign exchange. 
Here money is a given, and it is also closely attached to the most synchronic and self-referential 
outcomes of economic analysis: market equilibrium and the formation of relative prices. Clearly, it is 
difficult to reconcile this view with a more “genetic” approach that is centered on the constitution of 
money, its evolution, and its possible breakdown.1 
Two classical narratives of money’s emergence reflect this constraint in that both are very much 
ad hoc. One version is followed by those who think within the neoclassical or orthodox paradigm and 
so envisage money exclusively as a medium of exchange. That is, money is just the (n − 1)th good, 
which theoretically allows decentralized agents to shift from barter to integrated markets. In this view, 
money springs fully formed out of private exchange and its essential function is to reduce transaction 
costs.2 This natural history of markets then encounters well-known logical difficulties. If markets pre-
date money, then how can one account for aggregation and the operation of a price mechanism in the 
pre-monetary era? And if money is a commodity, what can be said of fiat money? What, then, is the 
point of having a central bank? In other words, this narrative may serve as a low-cost prologue to, say, 
the analysis of monetary policy, but it is not a promising start for a comparative or historical approach 
to explaining how money is established. 
The second narrative derives from Knapp’s so-called Chartalist approach.3 Here, money results from 
the act of a state, or a “charter”: a declaration by the sovereign that this or that piece of metal or paper 
constitutes “money”. The obligation to pay taxes in this currency typically gives the statement some 
muscle. Historical records confirm this story and also document the long fight of pre-modern states to 
establish their monopoly on money issuing and minting. Still, one struggles to account on this basis for 
the long-standing capacity of agents to create private monies or institutions that are supplementary or 
complementary to public ones—or, perhaps, substitutive or dilutive of them. 
Both of these narratives, the natural and the statist, raises the risk of “hypostasis of money”.4 That is, 
money is considered not as an institution but rather as some essence, of an extraordinary social quality, 
that was obscurely created some time after humans emerged from the state of nature. Beyond the 
largely unanswerable question regarding the ultimate origin of a social institution, the open question is 
how public regulators and private agents shape the evolution of money, and affect over time its overall 
stability and the quality of its services: how money supports private contracting and the proper 
operation of markets, and whether it offers the government an effective policy instrument. Money in 
its modern form is altogether a highly regulated institution that is closely tied to core government 
prerogatives, and an instrument of private contracting that cannot be imposed upon agents. In fact, the 
effectiveness of money depends entirely on their willingness to rely on it when buying goods, 
negotiating prices, or raising debt. Hence, its regulation is not only about policy making, whether one 
thinks to central banking, foreign exchange regimes, or the lender of last resort ; it is also about 
accounting norms, solvency constraints, the discipline of payment or banking regulation. In other 
words, rather than being constructed as some ahistorical or essential invention, money should be 
 
1
 This contribution draws from Sgard (2008), with less empirical material and a revised analytical discussion. 
This version benefited from comment made by Céline Bignebat and Witold Henisz.  
2
 Ostroy (1973), Jones (1976), Bell (2001). 
3
 Knapp (1924), Lerner (1947). 
4
 Cartelier (2007). 
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envisaged as a downstream, highly conditioned, state-contingent institution. In other words, exploring 
what early monies, say in the Pacific Islands, have in common with the recent experience of the 
Federal Reserve may not be a highly rewarding enterprise.  
In this contribution I look however at an indeed exotic and comparatively rare experience, namely 
hyperinflation. But because the two cases under review unfold in modern, capitalist environments, 
analysing them may add to our understanding of how money works in today’s advanced economies. 
Hyperinflations are indeed experiences where money as an institution is debased, sometimes 
destroyed, and possibly stabilized and reconstructed. They are indeed occasions when this institution 
becomes highly fluid and unstable: bifurcations and collapses may emerge in the very short run and 
then exert long-term constraints on its “re-institutionalization”, therefore on the future conditions of 
private choices and policy options. For instance, “dollarization” typically progress by leaps and 
bounds, under the pressure of brutal monetary crisis and more or less improvised policy reactions; but 
it is then extremely difficult to undo. 
This paper explores how a working monetary order was reestablished in Argentina and Brazil after the 
hyperinflations that marked the 1980s and early 1990s. What’s of interest here is not just the technique 
that ended inflation but also the process whereby money recovered its capacity to support economic 
calculability and market operations while serving also as a useful policy instrument. Comparing two 
nearly simultaneous experiences also allows accounting for the qualitatively different outcomes 
obtained over the long run as a consequence of the interplay between policy initiatives and the 
decentralized (informal) institutional choices made by private agents. 
The empirical basis for this comparison is that during the years of high inflation each country adopted 
a different response to the massive redistributive threats it experienced. Argentina largely transferred 
its monetary functions to the dollar. Brazil, in contrast, opted for a more inward strategy of protection, 
relying on price indices as an accounting hedge while the domestic, highly inflationary instrument of 
payment (i.e., cash) remained widely in use. Thus the two countries coordinated around two different 
monetary rules through a mix of decentralized or informal institutional choices and policy actions that 
triggered, confirmed, or curbed these choices. After stabilization (i.e., after 1991 and 1994 in 
Argentina and Brazil, respectively), the two contrasting regimes built on these legacies exercised 
entirely different micro- and macroeconomic constraints. The regimes also proved to be unequally 
sustainable: whereas Brazil succeeded in gradually modernizing its market institutions and expanding 
its economy, in 2001–2002 Argentina experienced a second major crisis that once again inflated its 
currency (though under a different scenario than with past hyperinflations). 
As a matter of convenience, I use the term monetary order to refer to the broad set of institutions and 
rules (both private and public) that provides stability and consistency to monetary relations and allows 
a national money to deliver its expected private and public benefits. I use monetary regime or policy 
regime to refer to the conventions and public organizations that are specifically related to monetary 
policy in the standard macroeconomic perspective: interest and foreign exchange policies, 
convertibility rules, policy commitments, issues of credibility, procedures and so forth. 
Section 2 explains how money consists of a unit of account and a unit of payment as well as how these 
units may be split under high inflation. Section 3 discusses the Brazilian Plano Real of 1994, which 
succeeded in reestablishing a working national money; and Section 4 addresses the Argentine 1991 
Currency Board and its eventual collapse in 2001. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Protection against high inflation: Theoretical issues 
Two monetary functions: Accounting and payment 
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Generations of social scientists—starting with Max Weber, Georg Simmel, and Ludwig von Mises—
have analyzed the key role that money plays in the development of individual agency, microeconomic 
calculations, and the capacity to leverage private resources across large social fields. Money 
empowers agents and therefore supports the dynamics of the division of labor: to the extent that it 
remains stable, money facilitates lending, investment decisions, and the sale and purchase of goods 
and services. 
However, money in action differs from a broadband network, a technical norm, or even a stock 
exchange: it can more easily be debased, and the externalities caused by its decline or collapse are 
potentially much larger. This is because once it has been established, in its current forms, money is 
seized and invested by decentralized agents who rely on it as they exchange on markets for goods and 
debt; that is, money enables the coordination of a decentralized division of labor based on contracts 
and payments, so that if its capacity to coordinate market exchange fails then the whole social 
machinery is affected. In the worst cases, the breakdown of the payment system may make it 
impossible to settle any type of transaction beyond barter; this is the endpoint of uncontrolled 
hyperinflation and a systemic liquidity crisis (i.e., the two paradigmatic crises for money). Conversely, 
restoration of the monetary order is typically associated with a recovery in private contracting and 
hence in economic activity. The prospect of falling into barter and getting out of it does not however 
surreptitiously reintroduce the “natural history of money” that has been criticized in the introduction. 
Barter is the ultimate default option when money brakes down. But how the collapse of money may 
affects social exchange is conditional upon how money had been used by agents and, beforehand, how 
it had been socially constructed.  
Yet a closer look reveals that money actually has two functions of coordination. First is the unit of 
payment, which is the instrument for settling contractual liabilities: it is provided in exchange for 
goods or services and it circulates as a medium of multilateral exchange. Therefore this unit is at stake 
when agents opt for barter: in some way, they cannot or they do not want to use it anymore. Money’s 
unique capacity to settle debts also explains why profligate governments have so much interest in 
issuing it: if the state controls the manufacture of money, then it can pay salaries and service its own 
debt without visibly raising revenue from the population. The unit of payment is thus the instrument of 
monetary policy, which is primarily about how much instruments of payments will be put in 
circulation in the economy. Hence it is about seignorage but is subject to inflation. 
Money’s second function is as a unit of account, in which real term economic values, or terms of trade 
are measured as a reflection of market forces (i.e., relative scarcities). Hence this function affects 
agents when they negotiate contracts, set prices, substitute an input for another in their production 
function, or trade off alternate financial strategies. For this reason, highly volatile relative prices, 
which are by-products of high inflations, reduce the capacity of agents to optimize decisions and trade 
off competing offers. Foreign exchange is another example: if its short-term evolution is unpredictable 
owing to high domestic inflation, then setting the price of imported goods in terms of the domestic unit 
of account may become all but impossible. Traders may then decide to post only dollar prices or stop 
trading altogether.  
However, the unit of account does not only support exchange on spot market, where the transfer of 
goods and money are simultaneous. It also records financial commitments: stocks of assets and 
liabilities. Hence it formalizes future obligations of payments, hence inter-temporal wealth transfers. 
The unit of account then bear strongly on a firm’s performance, hence on its sustainability, i.e. its 
solvency. It is one the key institutions that build the time-horizon of agents, specifically via their 
capacity to calculate economic choices over a more or less extended time-frame. High inflation are 
then associated with a considerable weakening of financial obligations, typically via large and 
informal or extracontractual wealth transfers between debtors and savers. Under such conditions, 
agents are driven less by solvency constraints than by protecting themselves in the short run against 
inflationary erosion (or by benefiting from the losses incurred by others). 
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Hence the unit of account supports two generic dimensions of economic calculation associated with 
two principles of market discipline.5 First is the relative price structure, which is synchronic (i.e. 
observed at a given instant in time) and which primarily reflects the efficiency of competing 
producers—that is, their production function, or the supply side of the economy. Second is the 
intertemporal financial structure of firms, which determines their time horizon, profitability and 
solvency, and thus the distribution of wealth. 
In principle, money’s “payment” and “accounting” units should be closely anchored one on the other. 
in which case inflationary erosion would affect both units. Firms would first negotiate terms for one 
work week (accounting function) and later pay for that work in the same money (payment function). 
Other things equal, intermediary inflation would cause a loss of revenue for the supplier. At this point, 
agents are like price takers on a competitive market or beneficiaries of a pure, nonexclusionary public 
good: they may either use this currency (and support the inflation risk) or exit.6 Under high inflation, 
however, agents tend to hedge their transactions and split the two monetary functions: they will 
typically include in their contracts ad hoc revaluation clauses that automatically adjust payments to 
reflect monetary devaluation as the contract matures. By definition this strategy concerns only inter-
temporal contracts. It may easily be applied not only to debt contracts, bank deposits, and wages but to 
virtually all financial transactions, including bonds, tax liabilities, insurance polices, rents, and so 
forth. 
Thus, the payment and accounting functions of money may be transferred independently of one 
another, so each may gain a life of its own. Agents would then act strategically with respect to the 
respective monetary units, though they could not ignore the choices of other agents – monetary 
substitution is also about coordination, hence it is by definition a collective choice. Within a given 
economy, if prices were set in five different substitute currencies then markets would segment unless 
one money emerged as the dominant one.  
 
Relative prices and economic adjustment 
Over the medium term, the key problem with a split money is that the economy loses a key micro- and 
macroeconomic adjustment mechanism. Normally, a one-off permanent adjustment of the exchange 
rate (or, more generally, any change in relative prices) leads to a corresponding permanent change in 
relative profit rates across sectors. For instance, a lower foreign exchange rate will cause domestic 
nontraded services to become less expensive and less profitable vis-à-vis internationally traded goods. 
Production factors will be progressively reallocated to the more profitable (exporting) sectors. Hence, 
the economy’s supply side will adjust to market signals and recover some growth potential, while the 
demand side will support the short-run adjustment of the current account. 
However, this mechanism does not work if agents systematically protect their purchasing power 
against any price movement. Suppose all producers, including hairdressers and plumbers, set their 
prices in dollars; then any change in the exchange rate of the national peso will be immediately 
reflected in all peso prices. Producers will simply adjust their price list as soon as they learn of the 
 
5
 These two dimensions of calculability are embodied by two classes of accounting books. On the one hand are 
inflows and outflows of payments as reported on the income statement, which reflects (a) the production 
function’s efficiency at prevailing prices and (b) the firm’s liquidity constraints and hence its capacity avoid 
immediate default. On the other hand are stocks of assets and debts; these are recorded on the balance sheet, 
which shows how future income flows will be shared among capital providers and thus reflects their individual 
risk in the case of solvency or bankruptcy. See Cartelier (2006). 
6
 After Cagan (1956), we say that hyperinflation exists whenever the monthly inflation rate exceeds 50% for two 
consecutive months. However, many of the dynamic patterns evident at rates of only 20–30% per month are 
much like those observed at 50%. On hyperinflations in general, see Sargent and Wallace (1981), Sargent 
(1982), Dornbusch and Fischer (1986), Dornbusch et al. (1990), and Vegh (1992). On currency substitution, 
Calvo and Vegh (1992), Rennhack and Nozaki (2006).  
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market movement. Rather than allowing for a correction in relative prices, the whole episode will end 
up in pure inflation, that is an homothetic drift of the whole price structure covering both the traded 
and the non-traded sectors. There will be no gain in price competitiveness, the balance of payments 
will not move and the supply side will not adjust. The same results obtain if producers anchor their 
price lists to a preestablished price index; only the time lag will be a bit different. In other words, even 
if the economy is flexible and open, a split and dysfunctional money may severely impact the way 
agents respond to market signals, hence the adjustment pattern in the real economy. Money is not a 
natural, given hence neutral institution: how it works and the services it offers depend upon how 
agents use it. This is the experience that Argentine and Brazilian agents made first-hand, although in 
different manner.  
From the early 1970s onward, Argentina chose the dollar as a dominant monetary substitute.7 This is 
by far the most common strategy in developing or socialist economies, if only because it does not 
require much in the way of institutional investments or capacity for collective action: a basic exchange 
bureau can handle the job with little or no policy guidance. Then this collective choice typically comes 
with large foreign exchange and banking crisis that cause large jumps in the overall level of 
dollarization. Argentina had its share of it.  
In contrast, Brazil already during the 1960s opted for domestic price indices as a hedge against 
inflation.8 This made it easier to preserve the state’s monopoly of the national money on payments: the 
bank could not readily open dollar deposits to domestic agents and, contrary to the experience of 
Argentina, cash transactions in dollar did not develop much, even informally. Capital controls also 
remained tight and imposed short-term constraints on private agents, although the point should not be 
overplayed. The sheer magnitude of revenue transfer under high inflation implies that domestic 
hedging instruments were actually available, for otherwise agents would also have taken the road of 
de facto dollarization. 
Compared with dollarization, indexation clearly demands better foresight and stronger domestic 
institutions, both public and private. Price indices must be timely, resilient, and widely trusted. The 
Brazilian solution was a decentralized and competitive supply of price indices. For years, agents could 
freely contract on the basis of monthly or weekly indices as well as of consumer and production 
indices, or sectoral and regional ones; some indices were provided by state institutions and others by 
trade unions, professional organizations, or chambers of commerce. In other words, the cruzeiro 
remain the dominant unit of payment though it largely lost its accounting function, which was 
altogether privatized, fragmented, and opened to competition. Yet the system still functioned in so far 
as it coordinated agents and allowed markets to function.  
Another example of institution-building is the interbank payment system, which should be highly 
efficient under high inflation; if not, enterprises may rapidly lose large parts of their working capital as 
a consequence of inflationary transfers.9 Or take the domestic bond market: Brazil’s 1987 introduction 
of indexed Treasury bills was the basis for strong growth in the supply of a broader array of private, 
indexed financial assets. Despite accelerating rates of inflation, the following years witnessed rapid 
growth in private balance sheets, in technical know-how, and in the use of high-tech equipment in 
Brazilian banks. Public regulation accompanied the whole process, which featured economies of scale 
and other positive network externalities. During this period, Argentine banks were nearly destroyed by 
hyperinflation. 
 
7
 Llach (1985), Giorgio (1989), Balinõ (1991), Sturzenegger (1991). 
8
 See Fishlow (1974, 2005), Lara Resende (1990), and Simonsen (1995). Actually, in each country both 
indexation and dollarization were observed simultaneously; at issue in this paper is the dominant form of 
monetary substitution around which institutions and regulations were built. 
9
 See Listfield and Montes-Negret (1996). In Argentina until the end of the 1990s, settlements between 
commercial banks and the central bank were still made largely in cash (i.e., via armored trucks). See also 
Angelini (1998). 
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The catch, however, is this: given the exponential nature of anticipated inflation, high inflation cannot 
be sustained over time; in fact, efficient hedging can serve only to postpone eventual stabilization (as 
it probably did in Brazil). Nonetheless, choices made under high inflation by agents and policy makers 
may shape their ulterior trade-offs. Under the pressure of economic crisis, agents offered adapted 
financial services and built up their balance sheets (i.e., they accumulated savings and investments 
contracts designed to limit the risk of decapitalization). Regulators then responded to these strategies 
by supporting, accommodating or restricting them, or by trying to influence them. All these factors 
later affected how stabilization was envisaged and how a monetary order was reconstructed. Path-
dependency is primarily founded on the mutual consistency between public regulations, market 
institutions, and the structure of individual balance sheets which reflect past trade-offs and also shapes 
present private interests.  
 
3. The Brazilian Plano Real 
Beyond nominal stabilization, reconstructing national money is about reanchoring the accounting and 
payment units to each other. That is: inducing agents to rely on the same money as a coordinating 
institution for their payment and accounting operations. After a series of programs in the 1980s that 
aimed to destroy (or at least weaken) the “parasitic” link between the national money and its 
substitutes,10 both Argentina and Brazil eventually opted for what was actually a much less ambitious 
strategy: a complete anchoring of the economy to its alternate unit of account, to which the unit-of-
payment function would then be legally transferred. Neither country relied on a policy surprise or any 
shock on expectations: the measures were widely discussed and voted on by the Parliament weeks 
before their inception, so agents had nearly complete knowledge of the stabilization’s logic before it 
was implemented. Therefore, coordination was not entirely the ex post result of individual market-
based reactions to the plan when introduced. It was relied very much on an ex ante coordination based 
on open, public deliberation. 
The strategy in the Plano Real (1994) was to begin by reconstructing the unit of account, which carries 
the highest risk because of the underlying redistributive stakes.11 Between February and June 1994, the 
plan sought to re-coordinate agents on a new daily accounting index, the Unidade Real de Valor 
(URV). It published by the central bank and was linked to the dollar but with no underlying 
commitment. At the same time, laws stipulated that all wages and all new contracts must be anchored 
solely to the new URV, and agents were given strong incentives to convert old contracts into the new 
unit—especially financial contracts, which carry the highest redistributive stakes. 
The consequences of this strategy were twofold. First, the fragmented unit of account was reunified or 
“re-nationalized”, so that it became again a coherent public institution. Second, the ongoing process of 
indexation (active since the mid-1960s) was almost fully completed, with the account and payment 
functions entirely separated. Everyone was now using the unified new unit of account, which 
supported the whole price structure, while continuing to use the cruzeiro, the old unit of payment. 
Practically all domestic private contracts and relative prices were accounted for in URV, with no link 
whatsoever to the actual instrument of payment and to monetary policy, which was still run in the old, 
highly inflationary cruzeiro.12 Hence, in June 1994, the cruzeiro’s 48% monthly inflation rate then amounted 
to a homothetic shift in the price structure. This was a most extraordinary and dangerous situation: the 
 
10
 The policy debate of the 1980s on inflation stabilization opposed orthodox monetarists, who argued that 
money control should be the sole anchor, and the so-called heterodox, who argued for multi-anchor programs 
(e.g., the exchange rate coupled with a freeze on wages and prices). See Dornbusch and Simonsen (1987), 
Heymann (1987), Bruno et al. (1988), Kiguel and Liviatan (1988), Giorgio (1989), Modiano (1990), and Bruno 
et al. (1991). 
11
 Arida and Lara Resende (1985) were the first to detail the logic of this program, more than a decade before it 
was actually tried. For a full description of its implementation, see Franco (1995); see also Garcia (1996). 
12
 Inflation in UVR was estimated at 3.7% between February and June, according to Sachs and Zini (1996). 
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economy had no monetary anchor, and monetary policy could have no impact on relative prices and 
real term revenues. 
Once the re-coordination of the URV was obtained, a standard monetary reform was implemented. On 
July 1, the unit-of-payment function (i.e., the legal tender) was transferred to the URV; this became 
the real, which replaced the old cruzeiro. The old fiduciary money was withdrawn, and the central 
bank began to conduct both monetary and foreign exchange policy in reals. Monthly inflation fell 
from 48% in June to 7.8% in July and to 1.9% in August; it remained below 2% during the two 
following years. In other words, a single, integrated monetary unit had been created that formally was 
as perfectly dis-indexed as the cruzeiro was indexed (on the URV) at the end of June 1994. The key 
intuition here is that—because individual hedging strategies had taken a decentralized, contractual 
form—overcoming the accounting unit’s fragmentation required starting from contracts and voluntary 
agreements. Thus, rebuilding money could not be a declarative, unilateral act of the sovereign; it had 
to accommodate the existing structure of financial contracts and the private trade-offs of agents.  
The cricital question the day after was whether the new real could itself lose the unit-of-account 
function. When confronted with a large foreign exchange shock, for instance, would the public hang 
on to the new national money? Or would agents once again shift their price list to an alternate 
accounting unit in order to protect themselves against revenue transfers? In this latter case, then the 
real would have failed to establish itself as a viable, integrated national money: its capacity to adjust 
relative prices movements and transfer market signals would not be restored, and inflation could easily 
ratchet up. 
This question was answered in January 1999, when a foreign exchange crisis was followed by a 35% 
depreciation in the exchange rate. Yet by the second quarter, annualized inflation had reached only 8% 
and remained at that level until year’s end—under a fairly restrictive policy mix.13 In these conditions, 
a textbook “J-curve” scenario of stabilization and export-led recovery could progressively take hold; at 
the same time the central bank adopted a standard inflation-targeting policy framework that explicitly 
assumed that the country could now run its own monetary policy, with no commitment as regard the 
exchange rate.14 
 
4. The Argentine monetary experiments 
Monetary reconstruction, I: The Currency Board 
The Argentine Currency Board, established in April 1991, shared many features of the Brazilian Plano 
Real. The main principle was to anchor the national peso at par on its parasitic substitute, here the 
dollar. By law, both monies became perfect substitutes: all the peso’s functions (including that of legal 
tender) were assumed as well by the dollar. In other words, it was implicitly conceded that the dollar 
had achieved an almost complete monopoly on the unit-of-account function; hence, the peso’s last 
chance for survival—as a (part-time) unit of payment—was to be anchored as solidly as possible to the 
dollar. At least some seignorage revenue would be kept, along with the unspoken option of returning 
to a single national currency. In order to maximize its commitment to the anchor, the Argentine central 
bank was required to follow strict rules of emission: the stock and flow of reserve money was to be 
fully backed by dollar assets.15 
The main consequence of this monetary regime was that domestic interest rates were driven 
exclusively by the U.S. Federal Reserve policy and the “country risk premium” as measured by 
 
13
 IMF (1999), Baig and Goldfajn (2000). 
14
 Bogdanski et al. (2001). Before 1999, Brazil followed a succession of monetary and foreign exchange rules 
with no a priori commitment; see Franco (2000). 
15
 Actually, 20–30% of the central bank’s foreign reserves could be in the form of dollar-denominated Treasury 
bills issued by the Argentine government. 
 10
international capital markets. Via the credit multiplier, capital inflows (resp. outflows) implied an 
automatic expansion (resp. contraction) of money supply and credit distribution. In principle, there 
could be no “sterilization” and no lender of last resort.16 
At first, the Argentine Currency Board was quite effective and allowed for some catch-up growth, 
which was fueled by large capital inflows. Its success in weathering the 1994–1995 Mexican crisis 
seemed, at the time, to signal its long-term sustainability.17 But the Asian crisis (1997–1998) and, 
more directly, the Brazilian 1999 devaluation proved too hard to absorb. The eventual collapse of this 
regime reflected the real term appreciation of foreign exchange (i.e., a loss of competitiveness) as well 
as increasing pressure on the budget and hence on the public debt. The result was a painful recession 
followed by a full-scale systemic crisis: the country lost access to international capital market in 
March 2001, and starting in October growing capital outflows led to a drastic liquidity and credit 
crunch. This was followed by a full-blown run on the banks and, in a context of severe social and 
political instability, a default on the public debt (December 2001) and a panicked exit from the fixed 
exchange rate (January 7).18 The peso then lost 72% of its value against the dollar; over the first half of 
2002, the GDP contracted by 15%, investment by 44%, and imports by 56%. 
 
Monetary Reconstruction, II: Pesification 
Simultaneously with these developments, a unique process of monetary disintegration unfolded along 
three different dimensions. First, starting in mid-2001, many provinces started to issue parallel monies,  
such as the patacones of the Province of Buenos Aires. Unable to enter capital markets or to tap the 
central bank’s cash, the insolvent and illiquid provinces settled an increasing share of their payment 
obligations (in particular, their wage bill) with this new type of IOU. The liquidity of these securities 
increased once they could be used to pay local taxes, at which time a number of enterprises (especially 
in retail trade) also began accepting them.19 This history is in line with Knapp’s (1924) views. The 
second aspect of the monetary disintegration affected the payment system through which agents 
should settle decentralized transactions: bank deposits were frozen on December 3, and foreign 
payments remained de facto blocked for more than three months. 
However, floating the peso also implied the sudden breakup of a ten-year-old institutional arrangement 
hence a mass of private arrangements, network externalities, and stocks of financial contracts that 
were premised on the assumption that the bimonetary constitution would hold. Critically, floating the 
peso was doomed to result in a highly unstable, two-equilibria situation in light of the open 
competition between peso and dollar, both of which were used extensively by the public. Agents could 
quickly and fully re-coordinate around one of the currencies, causing the other’s value to plunge 
toward zero—and there was little mystery regarding which currency would fall. For this reason, the 
main risk was not hyperinflation, as was commonly supposed; rather, the risk was destruction of the 
peso on the foreign exchange market leading to a domestic price explosion—regardless of whether the 
money supply could be controlled. 
This was the third component of the monetary crisis in Argentina: once the unit of payment had been 
fractured and the payment system frozen, the national unit of account could be destroyed almost 
 
16
 See Canavese (1992) and Cavallo and Cottani (1997) for a description of this monetary regime. 
17
 See Caprio et al. (1996) regarding the extreme measures taken to avert a full collapse of the banking sector 
during the 1995 Tequila crisis; also Calomiris and Powell (2000).  
18
 The year 2002 feature much debate (not recounted here) on the main cause of Argentina’s abandoning its 
Currency Board. See, among others, della Paolera and Taylor (2002), Fanelli and Heymann (2002), Hausmann 
and Velasco (2002), and Mussa (2002). 
19
 This monetary phenomenon had been observed locally during the 1980s as well as recurrently in Argentina 
during the nineteenth century; see Irigoin (2000) and della Paolera and Taylor (2002). 
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instantly.20 In Brazil, this risk had been fully controlled: until July 1, 1994, agents had no other choice 
than to pay in the old, inflationary cruzeiro until its entire stock was exchanged for reals in a one-off, 
nonmarket conversion. In fact, the Argentine government tried to take the same road in order to 
forestall a destructive open competition between the dollar and the peso: in February 2002 it decided 
to “pesify” the economy, i.e., to convert into pesos all domestic prices, wage contracts, financial 
assets, private debts, interbank payments, etc. In a chaotic context marked by unprecedented levels of 
improvisation, the objective was to give again the peso the full monopoly over the accounting and 
payment functions, after it has been lost since the since the 1970s. 
By the end of 2002, the results of pesification were quite remarkable from the viewpoint of an 
institutionalist theory of money. On the one hand, the price for goods and services responded 
positively: the nontrade sector exhibited only limited nominal price increases; traded goods remained 
anchored to international prices and so producers made large terms of trade gains.21 This is exactly 
what theory predicts and what Brazil experienced in 1999: the economy recovered, although at the 
cost of massive revenue transfers between sectors of the population. 
On the other hand, pesification had a destructive impact on the financial side of the economy. The 
main reason is that many agents in Argentina hold large debts and assets denominated in dollar; hence 
a precipitous fall in the exchange rate entailed a major redistribution of wealth. Dollar savers became 
nominally much richer, and those who had taken on dollar debt (because of its lower interest rate) 
faced insolvency. Hence pesification was implemented with two objectives: it aimed to rebuild a 
national money and to reverse, mitigate, or reallocate individual wealth losses due to declines in the 
exchange rate (i.e. between early January and late February). Reshuffling capital losses between 
agents and sectors became the key political economic issue. Violent proxy fights between interest 
groups and lobbies dominated the policy scene for over a year. 
For a concrete example, take the “asymmetric pesification” of banks’ balance sheets. In March and 
April 2002, dollar credits to enterprises were exchanged at a different rate than dollar deposits; 
enterprises were thereby subsidized at the expense of banks and their depositors. The government then 
decided to recapitalize the banks with the equivalent of 15% of GDP in Treasury bills—and this at a 
time when the state was already in default (i.e., patently insolvent). The utterly bizarre result was that, 
by the end of 2002, the only agents in Argentina who could measure their net wealth were those who 
had nothing (the majority) and the happy few who had everything abroad. Again and again the same 
questions were raised: Who owns what? Who is solvent and who is not? Who should exit the market 
and who may still trade and enter into new contracts? 
The sheer impossibility of answering these questions was finally reflected in the suspension of 
bankruptcy law, the ultimate regulatory institution in any capitalist economy. Whether applied to 
banks, enterprises, private consumers, or state entities, bankruptcy could not operate because of the 
confusion that reigned about how accounts should be established and settled. This was the endpoint of 
the collapse of firms’ intertemporal contractual structure and hence of the socially constructed norm—
namely, solvency—that confirms their viability or sanctions their failure. 
 
8. Conclusion 
From the late 1960s onward, Argentineans and Brazilians adopted contrasting strategies for hedging 
against high and unstable inflation. In Argentina, agents re-coordinated around the dollar as a 
 
20
 The Hungarian hyperinflation following World War II is a rare comparable experiment in which the economy 
had become de facto bimonetary so that the population could freely arbitrate between a strong unit and an 
inflationary currency. In July 1946, inflation of the unprotected money reached 4.2 × 1016; at the end of the 
month, when that unit was withdrawn, the total corresponding monetary aggregate for the whole country could 
be converted on the black market to 2,300 U.S. dollars (Bomberger and Makinen, 1983). 
21
 See Burstein et al. (2005) for a detailed analysis of price adjustments in Argentina after 2001. 
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dominant unit of account and unit of payment. However, the Brazilian economy re-coordinated on a 
variety of inflation indices; hence a more inward-looking regime took hold that better protected the 
private financial system and the real economy. In this sense, the 1994 Plano Real may contend as the 
most sophisticated (and the most baroque) monetary reform ever attempted. It first reassembled the 
unit of account by allowing a gradual, voluntary transfer of existing financial contract terms to a new, 
countrywide index. Then the unit-of-payment function was added; thus, virtually overnight a single, 
nonindexed national money was reborn that integrated both monetary units. An active issuing and 
foreign exchange policy was instituted at the same time. 
In Argentina, the informal process of dollarization was confirmed by the establishment of a Currency 
Board in 1991: a tight, bimonetary regime of a permanently fixed exchange rate whose aim was to 
“import” low-inflation credentials via perfect substitutability between the dollar and the national peso. 
But over the medium term, this solution was not viable because it led to a large-scale monetary and 
economic collapse by 2002. At that time, the authorities tried to duplicate Brazil’s strategy of 
reintegrating the two monetary functions into a single, national currency—except that Argentina tried 
to “pesify” its economy by fiat. Adoption of the new payment unit was not difficult, and few 
producers resisted setting prices in pesos. What proved to be much trickier was dealing with financial 
contracts, which by definition carry the greatest redistributive risks. In Brazil, agents had the time and 
a road map for renegotiating contracts privately: the microeconomic foundations of the monetary 
reform, as summarized in the balance sheets, were built before the new currency was introduced and 
monetary policy shifted to the new regime. In Argentina the authorities intervened in these contracts 
and reallocated private wealth on a large scale after pesification had been edicted anf after the peso 
had been floated.22 
One highly orthodox conclusion is that the capacity to adjust relative prices is indeed decisive in any 
market economy. But there is a caveat: the loss of this capacity may reflect a policy choice (e.g., a 
fixed exchange rate) but may also result from private strategies (e.g., monetary substitution). This fact 
confirms that money as a market institution is neither exogenous nor “natural”. It is jointly affected by 
regulatory and microeconomic decisions. Both influence how markets work but also constrain, in the 
short run and at the margin, the agent’s and the policy-maker’s trade-offs. For an example, recall the 
adjustment of shopkeeper price list and the economy’s response to a trade shock. 
Agents respond, sometimes strongly, to regulatory changes such as a stabilization program or 
monetary reform. Yet the impact of money on market dynamics depends on agents’ continued 
willingness to use it in ways that confirm the expectations of monetary reformers. A currency is 
institutionally binding only insofar as it (a) coordinates all private exchanges and contracts and (b) 
imposes itself at the margin as the self-evident monopoly provider of both the payment function and 
the accounting function. This is how money acquires its institutional character. It is formalized by 
statute but it is also the outcome of a decentralized process of coordination and strategic behaviour. 
Money then conditions microeconomic calculation and aggregation. An integrated and uncontested 
money then works through the whole division of labour and affects all market exchanges, via relative 
price signals. This is why its collapse is so costly for society and why it may affect behaviours over the 
long run. But because it affects individual trade-offs in such a comprehensive, symmetric, and 
nondiscriminatory manner, money also offers to policy makers a unique capacity to bear on virtually 
all individual decisions. It is a most remarkable policy-making instrument just because it affects agents 
as they freely calculate their market decisions. Hence, monetary policy can shape aggregate outcomes 
without impairing competition and private rights.  
Even so, the very attempt to police or manipulate money (i.e., to use it as a variable in the policy 
makers’ optimization) is contradictory to the agents’ assumption that money is a given: that is, a 
parameter, both permanent and nonnegotiable, that conditions their own continuing private capacity to 
 
22
 Cartelier (2006). 
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calculate and optimize. The experience of hyperinflation indicates that this ambiguity is constitutive of 
modern monetary orders and that it may also lead to their destruction. 
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